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Critical Interventions on Statebuilding 
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The age of humanitarian intervention seems well and truly over: all contemporary 
interventions are essentially statebuilding interventions (SBIs). The remarkable 
expansion in this international practice has generated a vast scholarly literature. Most 
of this work is of the ‘lessons learned’ variety: it asks why SBIs have failed to live up 
to their promises and proposes amendments. However, there is also a lively and 
growing critical literature which sees it as part of a ‘liberal peace project’ or an 
exercise in biopolitics. Two new books on the topic offer very different – and 
arguably more fundamental – critical analyses, and are indispensible contributions to 
this growing literature. 
 David Chandler’s International Statebuilding departs from the usual pattern of 
criticising the effects of SBIs, instead asking a more radical question: what is the 
problem to which statebuilding is thought to be the solution? What understanding of 
‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states are we operating with that makes statebuilding appear as a 
possible, indeed, necessary response? Chandler argues that ‘autonomy appears to be 
the problem which requires management’. That is, people in target states are thought 
to lack the ‘capacity’ to make sound political choices by themselves; intervention is 
required to build institutions, civil society, etc, to enable people to use their 
‘autonomy safely and unproblematically’ (2010: 3). Within this paradigm, 
sovereignty no longer impedes intervention but necessitates it, because it implies an 
autonomous political space in which people may make the wrong decisions without 
appropriate ‘capacity-building’ (2010: 45). Statebuilding reconfigures sovereignty 
from a right of non-intervention, expressing the autonomous self-determination of a 
political community, into a variable of technical-administrative capacity to manage 
autonomy in a responsible fashion (2010: ch. 3). Similarly, as Chandler shows in a 
devastating case study of European Union intervention in Bosnia, democratisation 
processes in SBIs are not implemented to liberate people to make their own decisions, 
but to create constraints to govern the future exercise of agency and prevent the 
recurrence of conflict (2010: ch. 5). 
 Chandler argues that this paradigm does not, contrary to most of the existing 
literature, suggest that statebuilding is ‘too liberal’ – quite the reverse (2010: ch. 2). 
This critique is common to both problem-solving and critical scholars: Roland Paris, 
for example, criticises SBIs as overly liberal when prioritising democratisation over 
institutionalisation; Oliver Richmond identifies statebuilding as part of the ‘liberal 
peace project’. But, Chandler argues, classical liberalism starts with the assumption 
that individual autonomy is a good thing. Liberals view democratisation and self-
determination as unleashing freedom and autonomy, not as involving the creation of 
new institutional constraints on them. Chandler’s central challenge is thus that the 
idea at the heart of statebuilding – that autonomy needs managing – is actually a 
fundamentally illiberal one: it is a form of post-liberal governance. Because the ‘too 
liberal’ critique is so common the literature, this challenge demands a response from 
most quarters and is thus sure to stimulate productive debate. Chandler’s attempts to 
read the post-liberal paradigm across other forms of intervention, particularly 
development economics and civil society-building, should also provoke arguments 
with specialists in those subfields, as he doubtless intended. 
 Indeed, there is plenty for critics to get their teeth into. Two problems stand 
out. The first is that, following Foucault, Chandler conceptualises post-liberal 
governance as essentially content-free and non-goal-driven; it is merely ‘a continual 
process of relationship management’ (2010: 72). Consequently, he essentially ignores 
the specific content of SBIs. In what precise way is autonomy being governed? Who 
benefits and who loses? Chandler offers no answers. Critics will emphasise that SBIs 
typically erect state institutions on the basis of neoliberal economic ideology. They 
may have an illiberal starting point but, consistent with arguments about the ‘liberal 
peace project’, their end goal is to construct a neoliberal order populated by rational, 
utility-maximising individuals – homo economicus.  
Second, and related to this, although Chandler will maintain that this project 
assumes autonomy must be governed, arguably every social order involves the 
(re)production and management of specific forms of individual agency. Chandler 
critiques institutionalist, constructivist, and other approaches that emphasise how 
agency is either shaped by institutional incentives or is socially, politically and 
economically produced and constrained (2010: 74-84). But this leaves him implicitly 
defending the view that full, unproblematic autonomy is an irreducible human 
attribute, present in the state of nature before the social contract – a view Chandler 
himself describes as ‘mythology’ (2010: 74, 92). This asocial conception of autonomy 
is a fundamentally normative one which emerged only with the social-material 
processes associated with capitalism.1 Even then, this individualistic ethic did not take 
hold automatically: it had to be instilled through various mechanisms – the 
marketplace, education, etc. Liberal societies have thus always tried to govern 
populations by producing a certain sort of autonomy while mythologizing-
rationalizing it as pre-social. Post-liberal governance may be even more problematic 
than the liberal myth, but it is not necessarily best criticised by harking back to an 
ahistorical and asocial conception of human autonomy.  
Shahar Hameiri’s brilliant first book, Regulating Statehood, presents a rather 
more ruthless, forward-facing analysis of contemporary statebuilding, explicitly 
rejecting Chandler’s ‘nostalgia’ for earlier forms of sovereign statehood (2010: 209). 
Hameiri also eschews the usual attempt to evaluate SBIs in terms of whether they are 
successful in building states, arguing that this can only involve benchmarking 
outcomes against a fictional, ideal-typical view of what states should look like (2010: 
ch.1 ). Instead, he asks a far more pertinent question: what form of statehood are 
contemporary SBIs actually producing? His compelling answer is: transnationalised, 
regulatory statehood. SBIs are conceptualised as ‘multi-level regimes’, operating to 
transform target states from within by establishing dominant ‘regulatory’ bodies 
within transnational spaces inside or near governing apparatuses, which then set the 
rules and goals for the rest of the state (2010: ch. 3). These non-majoritarian 
institutions are thus insulated from their own societies, but heavily penetrated by 
international agencies and their neoliberal agendas. SBIs are thus not simply trying to 
‘build’ states as we classically understand them, but to ‘regulate statehood’, that is, to 
fundamentally transform the nature of target states. This highly sophisticated analysis 
is borne out well in fascinating case studies on the Solomon Islands and Cambodia. 
Hameiri explicitly concurs with Chandler on a number of core issues, 
underlining the ‘anti-political’ nature of SBIs, and emphasising that statebuilding does 
not express an ‘all-powerful and disciplinary global liberalism’, but the continued 
centrality of state-based forms of regulation (2010: 40, 33, 28). The differences 
between these authors, however, are more significant. In particular, Hameiri’s 
treatment of SBIs is grounded in a coherent and powerful explanatory framework and 
strong, detailed case studies. Unlike Chandler, Hameiri contends that ‘regulating 
statehood’ is driven by substantive goals: the management of supposed security 
‘risks’ thought to arise from maladministration in developing countries, and the 
installation of market-friendly governance (2010: ch. 3). Crucially, rather than trying 
to criticise this by defending a romanticised, liberal notion of sovereign statehood, 
Hameiri emphasises that states always involve power relations and that the task, 
therefore, is to explore how power is being redistributed by SBIs. Drawing on state 
theory and political geography, he carefully identifies ‘linkages between interveners 
and domestic social forces’, and traces the ‘social and political dynamics that shape 
the exercise of state power’ (2010: 33). With this powerful intellectual framework, 
Hameiri is thus able to explain the determinate content of SBIs, and how and why 
new forms of statehood are being produced, in a way that Chandler is not. The 
emphasis on social conflict shaping outcomes also helps us understand why SBIs so 
frequently diverge from plan, although this is not Hameiri’s primary focus.  
Ideally, more attention should have been paid to explaining differences in 
outcome. In the Solomons, for instance, elites have been unable to resist external 
state-building efforts which have profoundly disrupted their traditional patronage 
systems (though money politics has largely been substituted instead). In Cambodia, 
however, elites have been able to combine an internationally-driven state-building 
agenda with existing patronage networks to further demobilise and exclude the 
opposition from political participation. Hameiri neglects analysing this discrepancy, 
suggesting only belatedly that Cambodian elites were better able to dominate the key 
regulatory institution which set the terms for the SBI – in this case, a donor-
government interface body – and thus twist it to their ends (2010: 212). This merely 
raises the question of how they were able to do so. 
Finally, Hameiri demonstrates that SBIs are not simply isolated operations in 
far-away lands, but have major relevance for governance in intervening states 
themselves, and for international order more generally. He shows, for instance, how 
the transformation of the Australian Federal Police from a small domestic police force 
into an agent of international statebuilding in the Solomons, Papua New Guinea and 
elsewhere has involved the reshaping of the Australian state (2010: ch. 5). The apogee 
of this is the ongoing domestic operation in the Northern Territories designed to 
forcibly restructure aboriginal communities, which is explicitly described by the 
government as an ‘intervention’, illustrating the way in which the internal/external 
distinction is blurring in intervening as well as target societies. Regulating Statehood 
is a path-breaking, important and intellectually stimulating book, which ought to be 
issued quickly in paperback to facilitate a wide readership. As with Chandler’s work, 
the book speaks to themes well beyond the statebuilding subfield, and will doubtless 
stimulate debate and future scholarship. 
 
Lee Jones is Lecturer in International Politics at Queen Mary, University of London 
                                                 
1 C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: From Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1962). 
